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Time series analysis of European Grid Blackouts 
Eugenio Gutiérrez 
Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 
Joint Research Centre, European Commission. 
 
Abstract 
 
We analyse time series of electric power interruptions in the synchronous 
frequency network covered by UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission 
of Electricity) over a period of 28 months. The scope of this preliminary study is to 
evaluate if the performance of this, the largest synchronously connected grid in 
Europe, shows characteristics of critically organised systems. In order to do so we 
have calculated the cumulative probability distribution and Hurst exponents of various 
blackout parameters. We have found indications that events in the time series do not 
conform to a normal statistical distribution, but rather, to a power law that implies that 
the distribution and magnitude of blackouts are correlated over substantial time-
scales. The implications for the occurrence of large blackouts are discussed in terms 
of the availability of data sets over more extended periods of time.  
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1 Foreword 
The issue of European electricity grid infrastructure security arises from our 
society’s complete dependence on a reliable energy source to run the utilities 
necessary for everyday life. Demand and market forces have motivated the creation of 
a highly interconnected network that no single government or organization controls 
comprehensively. The stability and security of supply is measured by the capacity of 
the grid to react to unplanned perturbations of its normal working conditions. Such 
perturbations may result in local supply failures that may cascade into blackouts, or 
outages, that propagate over extensive portions of the system. Perturbations may 
originate from many sources, accidental or malicious, but their end effects and the 
methods of how best to deal with them will be similar. 
The European electricity grid has, as a result of deregulation and competitive 
market forces, been running, on occasions, under conditions close to loss of 
equilibrium. This is because redundancy of supply and transmission capacity implies 
capital investments that cannot be offloaded onto a highly price-conscious market. 
Perturbations to the grid can rarely be predicted, however, the grid utilities have to 
deal with these in order to limit the propagation of cascading blackouts. To do so the 
transmission operators have developed sophisticated monitoring and control methods, 
and together they have willingly formed groups to develop regulations and procedures 
to mitigate the effects of disruptions. 
EU directives such as those concerning deregulation of electricity-supply 
markets [7] on the one hand, or those addressing energy security issues [6] on the 
other, introduce changes to how the grid system is run. Such policy changes affect 
directly the physical performance of the system as a whole. For this reason it is 
believed that the European Commission, and associated bodies, will have to take a 
long term view with regard to the market and security policies it implements in this 
area. While it should ensure deregulation would benefit EU citizens, such policies 
should not result in mechanisms that might reduce further the stability of the grid. 
A disruption of electricity supplies could have serious negative effects on the 
performance and security of the economy and citizens’ everyday life. The security 
challenge is therefore to make the electricity grid infrastructure more secure without 
compromising the productivity and advantages inherent in today’s complex 
interconnected networks. In order to do this both short-term and long-term 
technological development should result in the deployment of monitoring, diagnostic 
and control systems. These will affect some of the fundamental aspects of the 
organizations that run and supply the grid. In this paper we use the techniques 
currently being used to diagnose the qualitative nature of grid systems, and more 
specifically the statistical distribution of blackout events. 
It is important to understand the generic underlying statistical nature of 
blackouts and outages that occur in European Electricity grid systems in order to 
assess the possible risk of large cascading blackouts. Our concern is not with the 
cause of the power interruptions (be they natural, accidental or malicious) but rather 
on how the system reacts to generic perturbations. The robustness of a grid system to 
absorb disruptions manifests itself in the tendency for it to damp out cascading 
blackouts. Clearly some outages are small and contained, others, such as the Italian 
blackout of 28th September 2003, affected practically the whole country for most of 
that day. 
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2 The UCTE system 
The UCTE grid makes up the largest synchronously operating grid in Europe 
and includes both EU and non-EU member states (see Figure 1). Grid synchronicity 
allows the transfer of electricity from one state to another through a complex network 
of high-voltage lines that supply a population of 450 million people with an annual 
consumption of 2400TWh [10]. 
The main role of UCTE is that of establishing recommendations and technical 
rules for the synchronous operation of the UCTE grid. The aim of such rules is to 
render the UCTE system highly reliable addressing two main concepts: 
• Security and reliability (short-term stability) 
• Adequacy (long term supply and demand balance) 
 
 
Figure 1 Member states of UCTE (Source UCTE) 
UCTE has developed a number of rules and guidelines that constitute the basis 
for the smooth running of the grid. The operation of the system is therefore subject to 
security and reliability standards set within the framework of the UCTE cooperation 
agreement. One of the cornerstones of these guidelines is that the whole system must 
be capable of running normally even when a major failure occurs (e.g., the loss of a 
high-voltage line). This scenario is handled under the, so-called, N-1 rule which sets 
in place a series of measures aiming, in the first place, to ensure that stable operation 
is not disrupted and, secondly, to effect complementary measures to, at least, maintain 
the N-1 rule and avoid further cascading line failures.  
In order to ensure that the N-1 rule is observed at all times, UCTE requires its 
members to monitor their systems closely so that, on the basis of grid performance 
data concerning any particular disruption, the operators can apply the remedial 
guidelines laid down. The operators monitor and control the performance of their 
grids in real-time with measurement devices placed at key locations. Grid 
performance data, such as voltages and currents) is analysed continuously in order to 
produce a state-space estimation of the system; this allows the operator to have a 
snapshot of their grid section ready, should an N-1 scenario occur. If a disruption 
occurs the operator can then take remedial actions in accordance with UCTE 
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guidelines; quite often this involves exchange of information between neighbouring 
countries. 
UCTE gathers grid performance data from its members and has recently 
started to provide regular reports on the performance of the grid. In particular, UCTE 
compiles lists of electricity power interruptions that have occurred in the 
synchronously connected grid system every month. These provide information 
concerning the time, location, magnitude and causes of incidents. 
UCTE has provided the Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 
of the Joint Research Centre, with a catalogue of power interruption data for analysis 
in order to qualify the statistical profile of the recorded events in its grid. 
 
3 Electricity grids as complex systems 
An analysis of the power interruptions on the UCTE grid may be used to 
examine under what conditions the grid has been operating; for example, if the system 
is running at the limit of its capacity, the probability of large blackouts1 is more 
frequent than expected from standard statistical projections.  
Recently, new methods of looking at grid blackout data [4] have been used to 
identify if such systems show indications of self-organised criticality: i.e., the 
tendency of certain, highly complex driving forces, to push the functioning of the 
system to conditions that may generate unstable behaviour. The underlying qualitative 
phenomena that drive coupled, spatially-distributed, networks can be found in a 
number of naturally occurring phenomena. For example, in analogy with snow or 
sand slopes, grids are subjected to ever-increasing demands that tend to load the 
system towards instability. Just as fresh snow piling up on a slope results in 
avalanches when the gradient reaches a critical inclination, the complex loading and 
dissipative mechanisms (that include market and regulatory forces, as well as 
technological developments), increase the demand on preferential grid lines, which 
increases the possibilities of large blackouts.  
Cascading failures, just like avalanches, can be small or large, however, the 
distribution of these cascades conform to special statistical distributions which are the 
hallmark of complex self-organised critical systems (SOC). It is important for 
regulators and planners to understand the underlying nature and risk profile of SOC 
systems, so that they may put in place mitigation plans for extreme blackouts. In order 
to do so we must first establish if electricity grids behave like SOC systems. 
A telltale sign of SOC systems is that the dynamics of certain parameters over 
time (or space) follow power laws. Expectations of large events do not decrease 
exponentially, but rather, do so in such a manner that the probability of extreme 
events may be orders of magnitude higher than expected. If a system as well regulated 
and monitored as the UCTE grid were to demonstrate signs of such critical self-
organisation (as would seem to be the case in parts of the grid in the USA), then 
latching the present UCTE grid to the Baltic-Russian grid (generating a synchronously 
                                                 
1 The term blackout used herein, refers to an electricity outage, or power interruption, of any magnitude 
ranging from 1MWhr to 177GWhr. In a scale-invariant system, all blackouts—irrespective of their 
size—are, in a phenomenological sense, identical. However for grid transmission operators a blackout 
usually refers to events affecting hundreds of thousands, or millions, of people. Herein we interchange 
the terms liberally, but we point out that, in an operational sense, the terms have significantly different 
meanings. 
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connected grid from Lisbon to Vladivostock) could, potentially, add considerable 
stresses that, if not properly considered, could make the whole system less stable than 
it is at present. 
The presentation herein provides a preliminary analysis of the UCTE grid’s 
power interruption data and is intended to gain some insight as to the statistical 
distribution of power interruptions and how events are correlated over time. The 
analysis does not purport to draft hard and fast conclusions on how the grid is 
operating but rather as a diagnostic method to identify the qualitative behaviour of the 
UCTE grid as a generic system.  
 
4 Presentation of Data Set 
The data set analysed in this paper was provided by UCTE. The events cover a 
period from January 2002 till March 2004 and include the Italian blackout of 
September 28th, 2003. For each event UCTE provides a comprehensive description of 
the main technical characteristics, including: the type of line power rating, country 
(location), elements (substations or transformers), as well as indications of the 
mechanisms that precipitated the blackout (natural or otherwise). In our analysis we 
have onlyconsidered the following parameters: 
 
• time intervals between power interruptions. 
• undelivered energy. 
• power loss. 
• duration of the event (restoration time). 
 
Although the total number of events reported is 340, the data sets for the 
energy and power losses are incomplete. Some records contain no data for either 
energy or power loss, however, numerous examples contain one or the other. Thus, 
the data set for the undelivered energy is only 228 data points, that of the power loss 
was only 194, whereas the data set for the recovery times for each black-out is 333 
points. 
Some important details can be mentioned here. The longest wait between 
recorded power outages was 22 days, the shortest (other than synchronous events) is 
one minute. The smallest magnitude power interruption is 1MWh, the largest 
177GWh (Italy September 2003). The smallest power loss is 1MW, the largest is 
estimated at just over 9GW (calculated from the energy loss and average duration 
given for the 177GWh Italian September 2003 blackout). The shortest recovery 
(duration of power outage) time is one minute, the longest 31 days. We shall discuss 
how we interpret recovery/duration time as it is not explicitly mentioned by UCTE; 
however, we presume that the duration time does not necessarily mean that a group of 
customers was not served for the exact time given; but, rather, the time during which a 
particular line was inoperative.  
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5 Analysis of Time series data 
The time series data for the four parameters chosen for analysis are plotted as 
a function of time in days in Figure 2. The time interval between power 
interruptions, t∆ , (Figure 2a), ranges from weeks to just a few minutes. The 2003 
Italian blackout of September 28th is so predominant that it overshadows all other 
events in the energy and power-loss scales; hence we have also plotted the loss data in 
logarithmic scale in Figure 3. 
A priori, from the correlation matrix, shown in Table 1, there does not seem to 
be any correlation between the magnitudes of the events—in terms of power or energy 
loss— and the time interval between events. Thus, based solely on these data, 
knowing something about the time intervals does not provide deterministic 
information about how big the next power interruption will be. 
The power and energy losses, as expected, are highly correlated, but not equal 
to 1. One would expect that energy loss be trivially obtained by multiplying the power 
loss record by its corresponding restoration time. However, for those records where 
all three data parameters are available, the agreement is not one-to-one. In fact, as 
mentioned in §4, in some cases either energy or power loss data may be missing for 
certain records, for this reason we have chosen to analyse the energy and power loss 
data independently. 
Regarding the restoration times, these appear to be uncorrelated to any of the 
other parameters. Thus, the magnitude of the outage and the time it takes to restore 
power, seem to be independent from each other. What this implies in terms of the 
operational characteristics of the UCTE grid is beyond the scope of this analysis, 
however, it is an interesting anecdotal point. 
 
Table 1 Correlation values of blackout parameters. 
restore                      t      energy    power     t  
   t             1.000   -0.045   -0.007    -0.091
   energy                    1.000    0.915     0.003
   power                             
∆
∆
restore
    1.000     0.013
   t                                                  1.000
 
 
 
6 Hurst exponent and system memory 
Certain types of time series generated by natural processes may exhibit 
complex behaviour that may seem random but, in fact, are conditioned by 
deterministic phenomena. Such processes are said to possess long-term dependence 
(or memory).  
Unlike normal Gaussian distributions, an event at time it  has a direct effect on 
an event at time 1i nt + K . The persistence of this memory can be measured with the 
Hurst exponent H. The Hurst exponent is a measure of the correlation of events within 
a time series and its value usually varies between 1 and 0.  Thus, for deterministic 
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signals 1H = , for purely noisy signals, as is the case for a Gaussian distribution, 
0.5H = . 
The Hurst exponent is estimated by sampling a complete data set over multiple 
time-window frames, and then calculating the, so called, average re-scaled range 
(R/S) for each window. The slope of the plot (in log-log scale) of the R/S values 
versus the window size gives the Hurst exponent. A full description of how the Hurst 
exponent was evaluated for the UCTE data set is given in the Appendix. 
When 1 0.5H> >  the time series is said to have long-term memory, and the 
data are positively correlated in some manner. Thus, some randomly generated events 
will have an effect on future events that is forgotten with time. Events in the future are 
positively correlated to those in the past; hence increments (respectively, decrements) 
will be followed by increases (respectively, reductions) of the measured variable at 
some time in the future. The higher the H value is in this range, the more persistence it 
is said to have.  
When 0.5 0H> >  the time series is said to be anti-persistent —or anti-
correlated— in the long range. Thus, for anti-persistent time series, increments will be 
followed in the future by decrements (or the converse: decrements will be followed by 
increments). In natural phenomena persistence is more common, however, in some 
complex networks (such as financial markets) anti-persistence is exhibited for some 
time scales and is associated with volatility. In the economics literature, anti-persistent 
processes are referred to as mean-reverting; i.e., a process whose mean is zero over a 
sufficiently long time scale. Thus, financial markets and related systems [11], such as 
the daily bidding price in electricity markets, are often punctuated with periods of 
high and low volatility which is a sign of anti-persistence. 
 
 
7 Analysis of Hurst Exponents 
We examine the Hurst exponent of each parameter in turn. 
 
7.1 Time between blackouts:  
The trend in the intervals of the blackout data has an average slope of 
approximately 0.75 over the whole range of time lags. This implies that the intervals 
between reported power interruptions (irrespective of their magnitude in terms of 
energy or power loss) are highly persistent. Thus if a short time interval occurred 
between two blackouts it will have a persistent effect over the whole time span. The 
reverse could also be true; i.e., the effects of large intervals between successive power 
interruptions will persist over the entire range. The conclusion is that the time 
intervals between successive power interruptions are persistent and correlated. 
Had the slope been equal to 1 (H=1), then all events would follow 
deterministically from the very first event. Conversely, had H=0.5 all the events 
would be independent from each other. In our case, given that 0.75H ≈ , we must 
assume that some events are random, and many are the deterministic result of prior 
ones. Thus, some blackouts are randomly generated but these, in turn, generate others, 
which is a paradigm for cascading phenomena. The extent of the cascade cannot be 
observed from this graph, we can only conclude that many events have a deterministic 
relation to prior events over the time-scales studied. 
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Figure 2 Time series of power interruption data from UCTE grid. 
 
Figure 3 Detail in logarithmic scale of Energy and Power loss. 
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7.2 Magnitude of blackouts: Energy and Power losses 
Whereas the R/S data for the time interval between blackouts could be 
approximated well by a simple straight-line fit, the situation is markedly different for 
the energy and power loss data. In the range of time windows corresponding to 1 to 5 
months, the data for the energy loss can be fitted with a slope corresponding to 
0.64H ≅ , whereas for longer time windows (5 months to over two years) the slope is 
0.35H ≅ . 
From the power loss data we observe the same type of behaviour 
corresponding to similar time windows; thus, in the range 1 to 5 months we have 
0.67H ≅ , which is indicative of high persistence, whereas for longer ranges we have 
0.44H ≅ , and hence, anti-persistent. We conclude that, in the short-to-medium time 
window ranges, the size of a blackout will have a noticeable persistence in the future 
up to periods of half a year or so: i.e., small (respectively, large) blackouts will be 
followed by smaller (respectively, larger) blackouts in the short to medium term. 
In analogy to the financial markets, these data can be understood in terms of 
trends. Thus, a downward trend is peppered with instances where the market value of 
a range of stocks increases—maybe even substantially—within a time window; 
however, the overall stock value has effectively decreased. Fluctuations within a 
downward or upward trend are purely random elements superimposed on a 
deterministic signal. Of course we cannot predict what will happen in the future, as 
our interpretation can only be done with hindsight; but, what we can say, is that within 
periods of six months, the magnitude of the power interruptions in the UCTE area 
were not randomly distributed. 
So, what size of blackouts can we expect within a three-month period if we 
have data for the last three months? We could of course conduct a statistical risk 
analysis on the basis of the acquired data; but, in order to do so, we need to establish 
what kind of statistical processes are driving the dynamics. Clearly, the present data 
set does not conform to a purely random process due to the fact that 0.5H ≠  so we 
must have some idea of the statistical distribution of events, in particular, extreme 
events. We shall deal with this in the following chapters when we analyse the 
cumulative distribution functions of the data set. 
However, first we turn back to fact that the Hurst exponent for the longer time 
windows is less than 0.5. As mentioned above, Hurst exponents less than 0.5 are 
indicative of anti-persistent behaviour, which is associated with volatility —a mean-
reverting process whose average over the period in question tends to zero. In this 
range, the system dynamics varies wildly and strong anti-correlations predominate: 
i.e., large blackouts will be followed by small ones and vice versa. The primary 
mechanisms driving the system over long time windows may be very different to 
those that generate persistent behaviour in the short-to-medium term. It is presumed 
that some form of strong feedback in the system drives it in a chaotic manner. 
Anti persistence has been identified in financial markets and, recently, such 
phenomena have been studied in the time series of the Nordpool electricity spot 
market price [11]. The fact that it also appears in the time series for blackout size is 
noteworthy; but, it would be premature (based on this small sample size) to insinuate 
that the type of market and regulatory mechanisms that drive volatility in the 
Nordpool market may also drive the size of blackouts in the UCTE area. For the 
 10
moment we suggest that further study of such correlations (for example, studying the 
volatility of market prices in the UCTE area for the same period examined in this 
study) may be worth pursuing. 
 
Figure 4 Hurst exponents obtained from rescaled time series data. 
 
7.3 Restoration time 
In contrast to the energy and power loss data (but as was the case for the time 
between intervals), the restoration time data can be well fitted by a single straight-line 
plot. However, whereas the R/S slope for the time intervals clearly showed signs of 
persistence, here we can assume that the restoration times approximates well to a pure 
random process because 0.52H ≅ , is closer to what we expect for a random 
distribution. In fact, comparing the size of the power interruptions to their restoration 
times, we notice no clear correlations: some large events being dealt with relatively 
quickly and other, smaller ones, taking much longer. We can assume that, to some 
extent, the restoration times are driven by different factors to those that cause the 
outages in the first place. However, there can be no restoration time without a 
blackout, so some, de facto, causal relation exists between them. Restoration 
procedures, it is presumed, vary from country to country; restoration practices do not 
form a grid system (but are connected to it indirectly) and hence cannot exhibit the 
same type of persistence across time scales. Much depends on what is meant by 
restoration time; but, at present, this subject is outside the scope of this analysis. 
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8 Cumulative frequency and probability density distributions  
The evolution of many ergodic signals can be described in terms of their 
spectral distribution by a power law inversely proportional to the frequency. So-called 
power laws occur in natural phenomena [2][8], and are said to be scale invariant. 
When examined in the frequency domain such processes are said to have 
power at low frequencies. We shall discuss the implications of this below. 
Generically, a signal whose power spectrum decays as a function of 1/ af , does not 
have a normal, Gaussian, statistical distribution. Thus, for random white noise 0a = , 
for Brownian motion 2a = , whereas for generic 1/f noise 1a ≅ . 
When a dynamical system exhibits a parametric power law distribution, it is a 
suggestion that long-range correlations between widely varying time (or spatial) 
scales of the system are occurring [1]. Such critical systems also exhibit scale 
invariance and fractal structure. However, critical systems are inherently unstable: i.e., 
arbitrarily small perturbations can change the value of a critical parameter that 
generates a qualitative change in its performance. A self-organised critical system is 
one that evolves in such manner that leads it to operate at conditions close to 
criticality, hence the term self-organized criticality [1]. 
In SOC systems, the tail of the probability density distribution when plotted in 
log-log scale, decays in an algebraic manner, so that the probability of occurrence of 
large disruptions decreases as a power function of the event size, whereas for 
processes characterised by normal random distributions, the probability of large 
events decays in an exponential manner. Stated simply the probability of large 
catastrophic disruptions in SOC systems are more than would be expected by 
extrapolating a normally distributed probability function. In terms of risk evaluation, 
the negative effects may be compounded by the fact that the actual cost of blackouts 
does may not grow linearly with the blackout size [4]. 
In this paper we shall not analyse the tail of the probability distribution 
function (PDF) as its evaluation is susceptible to noise and requires a well populated 
data set. Instead, we shall analyse the tail of the complementary cumulative frequency 
distribution (CFD), which is simply the integral of the PDF. In this case, the slope of 
the PDF in log-log scale is given by 
1.PDF CFDα α= −  
The complementary cumulative frequency distribution is obtained trivially by 
counting the number of samples whose magnitude is less than, or equal to, a given 
value of parameter being examined. A follow-up paper will compare CFD and PDF 
slopes calculated on the same data set presented herein. 
 
9 Analysis of Cumulative frequency 
The cumulative frequency data for the four parameters studied is shown in 
Figure 5. The distribution of the time intervals between power interruptions ( Figure 
5a) is quite flat up to a range of 102  minutes (i.e. less than 24 hours). For long waiting 
times, the slope in the last portion of the cumulative frequency curve is quite steep 
( 2.15CFDα ≅ − , corresponding to a slope in the probability distribution function 
3.15PDFα ≅ − ); thus, time intervals between outages longer than a few days are a 
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rarity. Conversely, the expectation of hourly outages (irrespective of their magnitude) 
somewhere in the UCTE grid is quite high. 
The frequency distribution of the magnitudes of the blackouts is significantly 
different from their time intervals. From Figure 5b, we see that the rate of decay is 
much shallower, having an average slope of 0.85CFDα ≅ −  over a wide energy-loss 
scale. In fact, this slope would have been lower had we included the country-wide 
September 2003 blackout in Italy. What this graph implies is that the probability of 
large blackouts would seem to follow a power law with probability distribution 
function slope 1.85PDFα ≅ − . Hence, we can expect that a normal Poisson process 
does not govern the probability of large blackouts, and that very large blackouts 
would be more frequent than expected. In fact, the large Italian blackout of 2003 is 
even in excess of the value expected from the power law fit; i.e., had this blackout 
been included, the slope would have been even shallower. 
The plot of the CFD for the power loss, Figure 5c, is not as pronounced as that 
of the energy loss; but it too, is also indicative that a power law governs the 
probability distribution of large power losses. 
Given that the ratio of power and energy losses provided by UCTE is not 
identical to the restoration time (i.e. energy loss is not trivially obtained by 
multiplying power loss by the restoration time), we cannot expect their respective 
cumulative frequency distributions to be identical. 
 
Figure 5 Cumulative frequency plots. 
Concerning the restoration time itself, we find that its frequency distribution, 
shown in Figure 5d, in analogy with the energy-loss, also has a shallow slope. One 
could assume that energy and restoration times are more closely correlated; however, 
such an assumption should consider what is meant by restoration time; i.e., whether it 
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is the amount of time that energy was not effectively delivered to a customer or, 
mechanically speaking, the time it took to repair a particular line whilst still being 
able to deliver power to the customers in the area affected. Irrespective of these 
unknown factors, it can be said that the slope of the restoration time is also governed 
by a power law (slope –0,52  and –1.52 for the cumulative frequency and probability 
distributions respectively). This slope implies that very long restoration times in the 
system may occur, and that if these are linked to wide sectors of the grid, substantial 
blackouts are highly probable. 
In view of the limited data set, one should approach conclusions carefully. For 
example the Italian 2003 blackout lasted approximately 18 hours (although substantial 
parts of the grid recovered after only a four hours), however, the size of the grid 
affected was so large that the resulting energy loss was the highest in the UCTE data 
set analysed herein. As a general rule it can be said that, the expectation of outage 
times are higher than would be for a normal random distribution, hence expected 
energy losses are, statistically, in proportion. 
 
Conclusions 
An analysis of power interruption data from the UCTE grid system reveals 
that the time intervals between blackouts is not a purely random process; but, rather, 
events in the future are conditioned deterministically to some precursor (possibly 
random) event in the past (this is borne by the fact that the Hurst exponent, 0.74H ≅ , 
is indicative of persistent behaviour). As a consequence, we expect that short intervals 
between electricity outages will be followed by even shorter ones in the near future 
and we postulate that, when many power interruption intervals coalesce, they generate 
cascading blackouts. The size of the cascade will then determine the magnitude of the 
blackout. Such qualitative behaviour is symptomatic of self-organised systems and 
analogous to sand-pile and snow avalanches. 
Energy and power losses over short to medium periods (from a few days up to 
six months), also seem to be persistent 0.64H ≅ . For these time-scales small or large 
blackouts will be followed by, respectively, smaller or larger blackouts in the future. 
However, for longer time scales (from six months up to two years) blackout 
magnitudes show signs of anti-persistence 0.35H ≅ , whereby small —respectively, 
large— blackouts will be followed by larger —respectively, smaller— blackouts. This 
is indicative of volatility, which may be associated with analogous behaviour in some 
European electricity price markets. 
Whereas time intervals, energy, and power losses of blackouts show signs of 
persistence (or anti-persistence as the case may be), the data for the restoration time 
between events seems to have no time correlations: i.e., duration of outages are 
independent at all time scales on the UCTE grid. In spite of this, the corresponding 
cumulative frequency distribution seems to follow a power law, which implies that the 
expectation of large restoration times is higher than would be expected for a normally 
distributed random process. The same argument applies to the cumulative frequency 
distributions of energy (and to a lesser extent) the power loss. For these we find that 
the expectation of large blackouts can be fitted by a shallow-slope power law; thus, 
the expectation of large, country-wide, outages such as the Italian blackout of 
September 2003, is even under predicted by the power law fit obtained by excluding 
that particular event from the calculations. 
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Although these data indicate that the UCTE grid system (in analogy to other 
electricity grid and complex networks) shows signs of self-organised-critical 
behaviour, the results presented in this paper cannot be regarded as definitive due to 
the dearth of data used in the analysis. 
The conclusion is not that the UCTE grid is on the verge of catastrophic 
failure, but rather, that to increase its security further still, the use of non-linear 
analysis techniques could be applied in order to develop diagnostic systems more 
suitable to such complex distributed systems. Such diagnostic techniques, used in 
conjunction with innovative control hardware implementations, such as using Phase 
Monitoring Units deployed at key positions on the grid, will most probably develop 
over the forthcoming years as a means of improving the security and reliability of the 
EU electricity network. However, due to the interconnectedness of the grid, such 
systems will only be effective when conducted in collaboration with all the connected 
transmission system operators. 
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Appendix 
Evaluation of the Hurst Exponent 
The derivation for the Hurst exponent [9] presented herein is as follows: 
Given a discrete time series ( )x t  ranging over a period τ  whose mean is 
given by x τ ,consider a point of the data series at time nt , and define its deviation 
from the mean as ( )nx t x τ− . We perform this calculation for each point of the data 
series and sum over the complete range τ  thus: 
1
( , ) ( )
n
n
t
X t x t x τ
τ
τ
=
= −∑ . 
So ( , )X t τ  is the cumulative sum of the deviation of the signal from the mean. 
The range of ( , )X t τ  is defined as ( ) ( )( ) ( , ) ( , )R Max X t Min X tτ τ τ= − . 
The rescaled range is obtained by dividing the range by the standard deviation 
of the signal, hence: 
( )/
( )
RR S
S
τ
τ= , 
where ( )S τ  is the standard deviation of the range of ( , )X t τ  over the period τ  
which is simply given by  
{ }1
1
2( ) ( )
n
n
t
S x t x τ
τ
τ τ == ⋅ −∑ . 
In order to evaluate the Hurst coefficient we monitor the evolution of the R/S 
data as a function of the sample window size. Thus, the first point of the R/S data 
corresponds to window size wτ covering the whole period τ . We then proceed to 
analyse the data in segments of ever-decreasing size / nwτ . For example, a non 
overlapping bisection of the original time window would produce two R/S values 
corresponding to the two / 2wτ windows covering the first and second halves of the 
whole range. We then take the average of these to obtain a single R/S value 
corresponding to a window size 2τ . We proceed with more bisections until we deem 
that the number of points of the window size is too short to provide significant data. 
There is no hard and fast rule that defines the size of the smallest window, and some 
authors have analysed this aspect as a function of the length of the time series [3],[5]. 
In general we should consider the sampling frequency and the inherent dynamics of 
the event (if we know something about the time scales of the underlying driving 
process). Likewise, there are no specific constraints as to the rate of decrease of the 
window size or their placement along the time period (i.e. shifting window segments 
may or may not overlap). For our analysis we have chosen sequential windows whose 
size grows as a linear function of the signal range. 
The Hurst exponent is the slope of the loge-loge plot of the R/S versus / iwτ . 
